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Taking A Lesson From England: The
Contraceptive Controversy
I. INTRODUCTION
In England, the House of Lords' settled the question of whether
minors can receive confidential contraceptive care.2 The Lords de-
cided the question pragmatically, basing their decision upon public
policy for contemporary society and leaving aside questions of moral
right and wrong.3  In England, with forty-five out of one thousand
teenage girls becoming pregnant each year 4 and 17,000 girls under the
age of sixteen taking the Pill in 1984,5 the court recognized that the
problem would not just disappear by ignoring it or by imposing pa-
rental consent requirements which could possibly only increase the
problem.6 The value of education and accessibility to contraceptive
treatment has been proven in Sweden and Holland: their incidences of
pregnant teens are substantially lower than in England.7 This differ-
ence can probably be explained by the demystification of sex in Swe-
den and Holland through public education by the schools and the
media.8
In comparison to England, the statistics from Holland and Swe-
1. This reference is to the "Law Lords," the highest judicial court which is similar to
our Supreme Court. It is not the Parliamentary House of Lords.
2. Gillick v. W. Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth., [1985] 3 W.L.R. 830 (all refer-
ences to the Gillick case will be to the House of Lord's decision, unless stated otherwise). In
this case, the mother of minor daughters sought declaratory relief and criminal prosecution of
the national health authority. She challenged guidelines promulgated by the health authority
which allowed doctors to administer contraceptives to children under sixteen without parental
consent. This was a case of first impression.
3. Id. This Comment will also leave aside important questions of morality (i.e., whether
it is "wrong" for a child under sixteen years to be engaging in sexual activity) in recognition of
the reality that children under sixteen already are sexually active. As Children's Defense Fund
President Marian Wright Edelman stated at the second Annual Conference on Adolescent
Pregnancy in Washington, "[m]oralizing will not solve the teen pregnancy problem... [m]oral
adults will." Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1986, Part V (View), at 18, col. 2.
4. Children Having Children, TIME, Dec. 9, 1985, at 82.
5. Anguish of the Teenage Mothers, The Times (London), Oct. 18, 1985, at 15, col. 1
[hereinafter Anguish].
6. Gillick, 3 W.L.R. at 834-35, 837, 846.
7. TIME, supra note 4, at 84 (thirty-five per thousand in Sweden and fifteen per thousand
in Holland).
8. Id. at 82.
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den look good. However, compared to the United States' statistics,
the European figures look fantastic. Ninety-five out of one thousand
teen girls get pregnant every year in the United States, which adds up
to more than a million teens yearly.9 Researchers predict that if this
trend persists, 40% of today's fourteen-year-old girls will be pregnant
at least once by the time they are twenty years old.10 Although polls
show that adults in the United States do recognize teen pregnancy as
a serious national problem,' 1 counter to this awareness is the Reagan
Administration's stance of restricting the availability of family plan-
ning services. 12 The United States' law on a minor's right to confiden-
tial contraceptives is in limbo, because the United States Supreme
Court has not yet decided whether parental consent or notice is re-
quired before minors can receive family planning assistance.' 3 As
one commentator has suggested, given the political climate and a
growing movement concerned with returning to the "traditional"
family unit, the controversy is not over.
14
This Comment will explore the United States and English law
regarding minors and contraceptives, arguing that the English ap-
proach is better reasoned and should be followed in the United States
because it addresses the issue pragmatically and recognizes it as a seri-
ous human problem which stretches across the Atlantic Ocean.
II. THE ENGLISH LAW
A. The English Legal Tradition
The political attitudes and values of the British people have
9. Id. at 84.
10. Id. at 79.
11. Id. The Harris Poll released in November 1985 showed that 84% of American adults
considered teen pregnancy a "serious national problem". Id.
12. See generally, TIME, supra note 4, at 82.
13. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue. However, two 1983
federal circuit cases permanently enjoined the enforcement of a federal law requiring family
planning centers to notify the minor's parents when the minor seeks contraceptive advice.
New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc.
v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Although the law was enjoined, the courts' deci-
sions were based on the holding that the Secretary of the Department of Health exceeded her
authority in promulgating the law. The decisions did not answer the fundamental question of
whether minors have a right to contraceptives without the consent of, or notice to, parents.
Therefore, variations of the law might possibly pass judicial scrutiny in the future.
14. Squealing on Kids. HHS's Controversial New Regulation on Confidentiality and Con-
traception, 44 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 8, 12 (1983) [hereinafter Squealing on Kids].
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shaped their system of government. 15 Currently, the monarch wields
little power, 16 even though the monarchy has an almost unbroken his-
tory dating from before the Norman conquest.' 7 Parliament controls
the government i8 by making laws, 19 controlling expenditures, and
watching over the nation.20 Parliament consists of two Houses.21 The
House of Commons is the center of power and members have to an-
swer to the electorate. 22 The House of Lords revises bills sent to it by
the Commons and hears non-controversial bills first (before the Com-
mons) to save the Commons both time and argument. 23 On the other
hand, the third government body, the judiciary, is largely insulated
from the influence of the monarch and Parliament.2 4 The courts dis-
cover and develop laws and, when invited to do so by Parliament,
render opinions on a statute's validity. 25 The three major courts26 are
the High Court, 27 the Court of Appeals28 and the House of Lords. 29
15. A. BIRCH, THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 14 (1983).
16. See infra note 30.
17. A. BIRCH, supra note 15, at 31.
18. "People Control Parliament Controls Ministers Control Queen." P. DALTON, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 28 (1976).
19. P. JAMES, INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LAW 129 (1979).
20. A. BIRCH, supra note 15, at 196. Parliament is the only institution which has the
power to control the actions of government departments, provided the government officials do
not break the law. Id. Government departments can basically do as they like, as long as their
actions are approved by Parliament and are within the letter of the law. Id.
21. Members of the House of Commons are elected by the people and the House of Lords
are the peers. Id. at 23.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 56. In order for a law to be enacted by Parliament, a majority of both Houses
and the monarch must assent to the bill. Id. at 212. Occasionally the Lords will refuse to pass
a bill they believe has no public support. Id. at 56.
24. P. DALTON, supra note 18, at 33. Judges can only be removed by both Houses and
the Queen. See infra note 30. Judges' salaries are not annually reviewed and therefore salaries
are not discussed by Parliament as a matter of course. P. DALTON, supra note 18, at 32.
25. P. DALTON, supra note 18, at 43. There is no British equivalent to the United States
Supreme Court's power to declare executive actions contrary to constitutional principles. A.
BIRCH, supra note 15, at 196.
26. There are a number of local-level courts. Also, a large number of disputes with a
judicial element are entrusted by Parliament to Special Tribunals, which are part of the execu-
tive machinery. P. DALTON, supra note 18, at 32.
27. The High Court hears both civil and criminal cases, with original and appellate juris-
diction. There is no financial limit for court access, but the Court is divided into three divi-
sions (generally the cases are assigned by corresponding subject matter): Queen's Bench,
Chancery, and Family. Id. at 173.
28. The Court of Appeals has two divisions: civil and criminal. Id. at 174.
29. The House of Lords is the highest Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom, taking
authority from the High Court of Parliament. A case can only be heard by the House of Lords
if the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords (judicial), or either House of Parliament grants
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Although Parliamentary Acts through the years have delineated
the duties of the monarchy, Parliament and the judiciary,30 no written
constitution sets out the nature and duties of these government insti-
tutions. 31 The law of Britain is both unwritten (constitutional con-
ventions) and written (common law and statutory law).
32
Constitutional conventions, which emerge after "constant political
practice in obedience to some constitutional inspiration lying outside
the law, which moderates or nullifies the effect of a legal rule,"' 33 pre-
leave to appeal. Id. "[T]he House of Lords has greater freedom to develop the common-law in
order to remove uncertainty and suit the circumstances of the time." The Times (London),
Oct. 18, 1985, at 17, col. 1-3.
30. The monarch's power was limited by the Bill of Rights of 1689. Politicians invited
William of Orange (husband to James II's daughter, Mary) to bring an invading army to
England to depose James II. Thus was the "Glorious Revolution" born. The Revolution
ended without bloodshed in 1688 when James' army refused to fight. William traded co-mon-
archy status, with Mary, for the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights limited the monarch's power
in four ways: the monarch could neither make nor suspend laws without the consent of Parlia-
ment; the monarch could not raise money without Parliamentary grant; the monarch could
not maintain a standing army without Parliamentary authority; and the monarch could not
restrict the right of free speech within Parliament. A. BIRCH, supra note 15, at 21, 31.
The Act of Settlement of 1701 further reduced the monarch's power. The Act decided
immediate succession to the throne which had been in doubt because William and Mary were
childless and it was possible that there was a royal Roman Catholic illegitimate child. The
Settlement Act also stipulated that no future monarch could either be, or marry, a member of
the Roman Catholic Church. The Settlement Act also deprived the monarch of the power to
dismiss judges. Id.
The Reform Act of 1832 was the beginning of modern Parliamentary reform. This Act
increased the electorate and changed the voting system. The problem of burgeoning industry
and classes of people dependent on industry led to this reform. The previous system denied
wealthy merchants, mill owners, and artisans adequate representation in Parliament and in
local government. Id. at 31-36.
The 1867 Reform Act doubled the electorate, but complete manhood suffrage was not
achieved until 1918. Women over thirty years old could vote in 1918, but it was not until 1928
that women under thirty were given the same right. Id. at 37-38. The Parliament Act of 1911
abolished the House of Lords' right to veto legislation and shortened the maximum amount of
time between general elections from seven years to five years. Id. at 21, 53.
The Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act of 1925 and Appellate Jurisdiction
Act 1876 ensured that judges would hold office during good behavior, removed only on the
address of both Houses to the Queen. This power was only used once in 1830. P. DALTON,
supra note 18, at 53.
31. A. BIRCH, supra note 15, at 21. There is no documentary and authoritative statement
of government institutions. Id. The "constitution" has never been wholly reduced to writing
because Britain has not gone through the experience of overthrowing an oppressive system of
government by force and therefore had no need to commit in writing a constitutional regime.
Id. at 236.
32. Id. at 196, 212.
33. P. DALTON, supra note 18, at 24. Conventions arise from usage or agreement (tacit
or express). Once the convention is developed, it is adhered to even though the court will not
enforce the convention. P. JAMES, supra note 19, at 118.
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suppose the legal rules and regulate how the rules work. 34 In courts
of law, conventions can not be cited as prevailing precedent. 35 The
British legal system also consists of statutory and common law. 36
Statutory law is enacted by Parliament. 7 Common law is the judges'
interpretation of law over the centuries.3 8 Since the availability of
contraceptives to minors under sixteen discussed in this Comment has
not been addressed and resolved by Parliament, case law (common
law) is the source of constitutional law.39
But any rule of the British constitution, no matter how funda-
mental, can be changed by a Parliamentary Act passed by the usual
majority of both Houses and assented to by the Queen.40 Even
though the rights to personal liberty,41 to property, to free speech, to
assembly, to association, and to equal treatment may be termed "con-
stitutional rights, '42 there are no "guaranteed" rights for individuals
because Parliament can change the laws at any time.4 3 The presump-
tion of individual liberty rests on age-old assumptions by British
courts that a person is free to do as he or she pleases as long as there is
no specific breach of law.44 Also, once the courts have decided that a
right exists, a remedy is implied even if one is not expressly granted. 45
34. P. JAMES, supra note 19. Conventions also govern relationships between different
parts of government. For example, convention dictates that Ministers must account for their
executive acts to Commons and answer the Members questions. Id. Conventions also help
solve the problem of how the people can control executive power. For example, under the
Meeting of Parliament Act of 1694, Parliament must be summoned at least once every three
years. But by convention, Parliament must be summoned at least once a year. Id. at 23.
35. P. DALTON, supra note 18, at 15.
36. A. BIRCH, supra note 15, at 212.
37. Id. Bills can originate in either House, but a majority of both Houses and the mon-
arch must agree to pass the bill. At each House, a bill must pass through three readings before
it passes to the other House. Id.
38. Id.
39. P. DALTON, supra note 18, at 16. Even if a particular topic is governed by a statute,
judicial precedent can play an important role in interpreting the statute's language, when the
meaning of the words are in dispute. Id. at 17.
40. Id. at 28.
41. No right to privacy is found under English law, although the right might receive
incidental protection through the laws. Id. at 238. This right to privacy focuses on the poten-
tial use by the executive of information about an individual for purposes other than those for
which it was obtained, rather than an individual's privacy to receive family planning assistance
without the interference of the government. Id.
42. P. JAMES, supra note 19, at 158.
43. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
44. A. BIRCH, supra note 15, at 236. The limits of freedom are known only after they
have been transgressed. Id.
45. P. DALTON, supra note 18, at 212. The implied remedy does have limitations, such
as certain judicial and diplomatic immunities and statutory duties. Id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.
At the local level, city government is subject to control by the
national government. 46 For example, each city may have its own con-
stitution, but local governments cannot change their constitutions
without Parliamentary authority.47 Furthermore, each city must pro-
vide the minimal standard, determined by Parliament, of education,
police, sanitation, and public health services. 4 If the city fails to meet
the minimum requirements, then the appropriate Parliamentary min-
ister will act for the city and send them the bill.49 Control over local
administration rests on the fact that these authorities receive over half
of their income from revocable national government grants. 50
B. The Gillick Case
Before 1980, no British case or statute had ever considered a mi-
nor's right to confidential contraceptives. The contraceptives contro-
versy began in December 1980, when the Department of Health and
Social Security (DHSS) issued guidance on family planning services
for young people. 51  The DHSS emphasized that doctors, relying on
their own discretion, could prescribe contraceptives for a girl under
sixteen, without parental consent or notice.52  Responding to this cir-
cular, Mrs. Gillick, a mother with minor children, wrote to the area
health administrator in March, 1981 to forbid the prescription of any
contraception treatment to her daughters who were under sixteen.
53
The health authority maintained that the treatment decision was left
46. A. BIRCH, supra note 15, at 223.
47. Id. In other words, each city has only those powers given to it by Parliament.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 225.
51. Gillick v. W. Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth., [1985] 3 W.L.R. 830, 834. The
notice included this: "It is, however, widely accepted that consultations between doctors and
patients are confidential; and the department recognizes the importance which doctors and
patients attach to this principle .... To abandon this principle for children under 16 might
cause some not to seek professional advice at all." Id. at 835 (quoting Memorandum of
Guidance (H.S.C.(I.S.)32), "The Young."). The first statutory provision regarding contracep-
tive advice and treatment which allowed local health authorities to make their own arrange-
ments for giving advice and treatment was the Family Planning Act 1967, subsequently
amended to the National Health Service Act 1977. Neither the original Act nor its amend-
ments limited the contraceptive advice and treatment by age. Gillick v. W. Norfolk & Wis-
bech Area Health Auth. (C.A.), [1985] 2 W.L.R. 413, 416-17.
52. Gillick, 3 W.L.R. at 834-35.
53. Id. at 835-36. The House of Lord's opinion was careful to point out that Mr. Gillick
was in full agreement with his wife's suit and secondly, that there was no suggestion that Mrs.




to the doctor's discretion.5 4  A year later, Mrs. Gillick sued the area
health authority and the DHSS, seeking a declaration that the gui-
dance was unlawful and that no doctor or other professional person
employed by the health authority treat her children under sixteen
without her knowledge and consent. 55
The case was dismissed in 1984 by the Queen's Bench.56 How-
ever, the Court of Appeals allowed Mrs. Gillick's appeal and granted
the declarations. 57 The House of Lords heard arguments in June and
July of 1985, and decided the case in October 1985. Three Lords
voted in favor of upholding the guidance and two Lords dissented. 58
Although the matter was closely decided, a majority of the Lords de-
cided the case in favor of the DHSS.
Three issues were raised in the House of Lords: (1) does a girl
under the age of sixteen have the legal capacity to give a valid consent
for contraceptive advice and treatment, which includes a medical ex-
amination; (2) does giving such advice and treatment to a girl under
sixteen, without her parents' consent, infringe on the parents' rights;
and (3) does a doctor who gives such advice or treatment to a girl
under sixteen, without her parents' consent, incur criminal liability
for aiding and abetting the unlawful sexual intercourse of a minor?59
On the issue of a child under sixteen having the capacity to con-
sent to medical treatment, the court decided that since no statutory
provision required an opposite finding, consent was legal if the child
had sufficient understanding and intelligence to know what "consent"
entailed.60 Whether the child is mature enough to understand all the
implications of consent is a question of fact.61 Prior to this decision,
the ability of a minor under sixteen to consent to treatment had been
54. Id. at 836.
55. Id.
56. Gillick v. W. Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth. (QBD), [1984] 1 All E.R. 365.
57. Gillick (C.A.), 2 W.L.R. at 413.
58. Gillick, 3 W.L.R. at 830. The dissenting Lords were Lord Brandon of Oakbrook and
Lord Templeman.
59. Id. at 837.
60. Id. at 839. The five conditions which allow doctors to prescribe contraceptives with-
out parental notice are: (1) the child must understand the advice and treatment; (2) the doctor
is unable to persuade the child to inform the parents or allow the doctor to inform the parents
of the contraceptive treatment; (3) the child is likely to have or continue to have sexual en-
counters without contraceptives; (4) the child's mental and physical health will suffer if she
does not receive contraceptive advice; and (5) the child's best interests require contraceptive
advice with or without parental consent. Id. at 844.
61. Id. at 858.
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uncertain.62 But Lord Fraser removed this uncertainty by deciding,
for practical reasons, that children under sixteen could consent legally
to medical treatment if the child understood the full implications of
the consent given. 63 Therefore, a minor can consent to medical treat-
ment at the age of sixteen and the minor's parents do not have the
authority to invalidate this consent.64
Secondly, on the issue of whether the parents' rights would be
infringed if a child under sixteen received contraceptive treatment
without parental consent, the court decided that the parent does not
have an absolute right to veto the child's decisions. 65 In general, a
parent's rights, appropos his or her child, are extremely difficult to
define because the term "rights" encompasses both explicit legal
rights, such as the right to withhold consent to marriage, and also
implied social rights, including the right to control the child's move-
ment.66 Parental authority is merely incidental to the ordinary re-
sponsibility of parents in raising children and this authority can be
delegated to others in certain circumstances, such as to school author-
ities and to court officials.67 Parents' rights are shared concurrently
62. Id. at 837. Lord Fraser examined several statutes to determine whether a child under
sixteen did have the capacity to consent. Id. at 837-40. He discussed National Health Service,
Mental Health, and Education Acts which implied that children under sixteen could not con-
sent to medical services. Id. Specifically, the Act Mrs. Gillick was relying on the most was the
Family Law Reform Act 1969:
(1) Consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years to any surgical,
medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute a
trespass to his person, shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age; and
where a minor has by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treat-
ment it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it from his parent or guard-
ian. . . ; (3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as making ineffective any
consent which would have been effective if this section had not been enacted.
Family Law Reform Act 1969. Mrs. Gillick construed the Act as lowering the age for medical
consent to sixteen, but for any lesser age, consent must be given by the parents or guardian.
But the Act was interpreted by the DHSS and health authority as not only making sixteen the
age of consent for medical treatments, but ensuring that a consent by a minor under sixteen
which would have been valid before the Act (here, consent for contraceptives) could still be
relied upon. Gillick (C.A.), 2 W.L.R. at 421. But Lord Fraser dismissed the implications of
these Acts as "absurd," since he could find no good reason that a fifteen year old, who is
capable of understanding what is proposed and can express this understanding, does not have
the capacity to express his/her understanding validly and effectively and therefore authorize
medical treatment. Gillick, 3 W.L.R. at 839-40.
63. Gillick, 3 W.L.R. at 839-40.
64. Id. at 837, 852; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
65. Gillick, 3 W.L.R. at 844.
66. In re. N., [1974] Fam. 40; [1973] 3 W.L.R. 866; P. DALTON, supra note 18, at 870.
67. See P. DALTON, supra note 18, at 212.
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by the mother and the father, 6 but these rights are not absolute in
themselves because disputes between the parents as to how a child
should be raised are subject to court adjudication. 69 In fact, the par-
ents' right "is a dwindling right which the courts will hesitate to en-
force against the wishes of the child and the more so the older he is.
[The parents' right] starts with a right of control and ends with little
more than advice."' 70 Parents' rights are not rigid and do not exist for
the benefit of the parent; parents' rights exist for the benefit of the
child, for as long as the child needs to be protected. 7' The decision to
give contraceptive treatment without parental consent must be based
on what is best for the particular child's welfare. 72 Therefore,
although in most cases the parents would be in the best position to
determine the child's best interest, it would be possible, but unusual,
for a doctor to treat the child at his or her own discretion. 73
A doctor would be justified in treating a child under sixteen with-
out parental consent by meeting five conditions. First, the child, de-
spite her age, must understand the doctor's advice. Second, the
doctor must be unable to persuade the child to either tell her parents
or allow the doctor to inform them of the treatment. Third, the child
is likely to have sexual intercourse whether or not she receives the
contraceptives from the doctor. Fourth, the child's mental or physical
health will suffer if she does not receive the contraceptives. Finally,
receiving contraceptives must be in the child's best interests. 74 In
other words, parental power to control the child is based upon the
principle that the parent maintains, protects, and educates the child
until the child can look after herself and make her own decisions.75
68. Previously, only the father had guardianship rights over legitimate children. P.
JAMES, supra note 19, at 528.
69. Id.
70. Hewer v. Bryant, [1970] 1 Q.B. 357, 369 (Lord Denning). Hewer expressly overruled
a 19th Century decision (In re Agar-Ellis, [1883] 24 Ch.D. 317, a case where a father was
allowed to restrict communications between his daughter and her mother, based on his abso-
lute control over his children.). This view is exactly opposite that which was expressed by
Parker at the Court of Appeals. "The repudiation of the notion that intellectual precocity can
hasten the age at which a minor can be considered to be of sufficient discretion to exercise a
wise choice for its own interests ... is to be noted." Gillick (C.A.), 2 W.L.R. at 426. Here,
Lord Fraser agreed with the view of the parents' rights expressed in Hewer. Gillick, 3 W.L.R.
at 840-46.
71. Gillick, 3 W.L.R. at 854.
72. Id. at 843.
73. Id. at 843-44.
74. Id. at 844.
75. Id. at 855.
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Since no case law or statute had previously determined the duration
or extent of parental control over children under sixteen, this issue
was open for the House of Lords to formulate their own rule.
76
Finally, on the matter of the doctor's criminal liability for treat-
ing the child without parental consent, the court decided that the doc-
tor's state of mind or intent in prescribing the contraceptives to a
child would control the issue of criminal liability. 77 As long as the
doctor satisfied himself that the child understood his advice and the
doctor's "clinical" advice was based on an honest belief that the treat-
ment was necessary for his patient's physical, mental and emotional
health, then there would be no question of the doctor having the
"guilty mind" necessary to aid and abet the instance of unlawful sex-
ual intercourse of the child.78 At the same time though, the court did
not mean for this decision to be interpreted as a license for doctors to
disregard the parents' wishes. 79  Any doctor irresponsibly discharg-
ing his duties would be subject to the discipline of his professional
body (i.e., the British Medical Association).s°
As a result of this decision, the DHSS immediately reinstated its
guidance, although it was to be "fully reviewed" in accordance with
the House of Lords' opinion."s Even though some conservative Par-
liament members called for a change in law, a wide range of parties,
including the British Medical Association, the Family Planning Asso-
ciation, and the Church of England Children's Society, welcomed the
decision.8 2 For Mrs. Gillick, the fight was over; although she had the
option to pursue the case further with the European Court of Human
Rights, she decided not to take the case further.
8 3
76. Id.
77. Id. at 845.
78. Id. at 845, 859-60.
79. Id. at 844.
80. Id. at 844-45.
81. Timmins, Gillick Loses Fight To Ban Pill For Under 16s, The Times (London), Oct.
18, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
82. Id. at 1, col. 2.
83. Id. at 32, col. 1. As an interesting sidelight, Mrs. Gillick and her husband were
involved in "scuffles" with students at Oxford on the day the decision was announced. Stu-
dents injured by Mrs. Gillick's stiletto heels attempted to lay charges against her at a local
police station, but the students were told to seek their remedy through the civil courts and not
the police. Mrs. Gillick denied the fight's existence and labeled the students "socialist workers
out for trouble." Also, Mr. Gillick suffered his own injury (missing eyeglasses). His comment:
"As far as I am concerned they are parasites." Id.
[Vol. 9:499
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III. THE UNITED STATES LAW
A. Before the "Squeal Rule"
'8 4
Minors are protected by the United States Constitution and pos-
sess constitutional rights,85 although each state has broad authority to
regulate children due to the state's interest in guarding the minor's
welfare. 86 The state's authority over minors stems from the common
law view that minors lack sufficient capacity to understand the conse-
quences of their actions. 87 Included in these constitutional rights is a
"right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy.., broad enough to encompass a woman's decision [regard-
ing her pregnancy]. ' ' 88 A minor's right to privacy was first advanced
84. A "[r]egulation ... requiring notice to the parents of teenagers seeking to obtain
prescription contraceptives from certain federally funded family planning clinics." Squealing
on Kids, supra note 14, at 8.
85. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). "Constitutional rights do
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state defined age of
majority." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 74 (1967). The decision of In re Gault significantly ex-
tended the rights of minors: required notice of charge in delinquency hearings, right to coun-
sel, right to confront and examine witnesses and the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
86. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The
Supreme Court in Prince upheld a state law making it a crime for children to sell merchandise
in public places. The child there was distributing religious pamphlets with her aunt. See also
Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations on State Action After Danforth and Carey, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1221 (1977).
87. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75-76.
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
The right to privacy was first articulated in an 1890 Harvard Law Review article by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. The "right to be let alone" was transformed into the
"right to privacy." S. HUFSTEDLER, THE DIRECTIONS AND MISDIRECTIONS OF A CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY 11 (1971). Warren and Brandeis' article was a response to the
media's intrusions into people's lives and the wide circulation of personal information. "Gos-
sip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is
pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual
relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers." Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890). There are three distinct "rights to pri-
vacy": common law privacy which is concerned with unlawful invasion into personal informa-
tion - the type addressed by Warren and Brandeis' article; the constitutional right to privacy
at issue here; and statutory privacy which is concerned with access to personal data gathered
and stored by computers. Comment, Carey v. Population Services International. Closing the
Curtain on Comstockery, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565, 574 n.47 (1978).
This zone of privacy was found in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, specifically the 9th
Amendment. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. This amend-
ment explicitly states that just because a right is unwritten, it does not necessarily mean the
right does not exist. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Despite the fragile
protection of privacy found in the federal constitution, many states explicitly guarantee the
right to privacy in their own constitutions. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
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in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth8 9 to cover the privacy right of a
minor to receive an abortion without an absolute parental or state
veto. This right to privacy was extended in Carey v. Population Serv-
ices90 to contraceptive access where an absolute parental or state veto
can be limited by a significant state interest. 91 State restrictions limit-
ing a minor's privacy rights are valid only if the restrictions serve
''any significant state interest ... that is not present in the case of an
adult."' 92 This "significant state interest" test is easier for the state to
meet than the "compelling state interest" test used to justify the re-
striction on adult's privacy rights,93 since the state has greater power
to regulate the conduct of children 94 and because the law regards mi-
nors as less capable of making important decisions. 95 However, the
state's authority over minors is limited by the minor's and the par-
ents' rights.96 Therefore, a minor's decision regarding contraceptive
[The] right of privacy, whether it be founded in the fourteenth amendment's concept
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the Dis-
trict Court determined, in the ninth amendment's reservations of rights to the people,
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. In Roe, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statute making the
procuring of an abortion a crime (except by medical advice for the purpose of saving the
mother's life). The plaintiff was an unmarried and pregnant woman who was unable to get a
"legal" abortion because her life was not in danger. See also, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). In Eisenstadt, a law regulating non-married adults' access and use of contraceptives
was found unconstitutional. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at
453 (emphasis in original).
89. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
90. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Contraceptive distributors challenged the constitutionality of a
New York law which prohibited, inter alia, the distribution of contraceptives to anyone under
sixteen years old. The Court held a state may not impose a blanket prohibition or blanket
requirement of parental consent on the distribution of contraceptives to minors. Id. at 694-95.
91. In Carey, the Court stated:
[W]hen a State, as here, burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, its attempt to
justify that burden as a rational means for the accomplishment of some significant
state policy requires more than a bare assertion, based on a conceded complete ab-
sence of supporting evidence, that the burden is connected to such a policy.
Id. at 696.
92. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
93. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15.
94. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The law may subject minors to more
stringent limitations than what is permissible with respect to adults because of the State's
interest in assuring the minor's welfare. Id. at 168-70. The Supreme Court in Prince upheld a
state law making it a crime for children to sell merchandise in public cases.
95. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15.
96. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). "Parental discretion has been pro-
tected from unwarranted or unreasonable interference from the State." Similarly, in Pierce v.
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use 97 must be made with consideration of all three interests: the mi-
nor's, the state's and the parents'. 98
Two examples illustrate this test of the state's interests. In Ca-
rey, a New York statute prohibiting the distribution or sale of any
contraceptive to a minor was challenged by contraceptive manufac-
turers and distributors. 99 The United States Supreme Court was re-
luctant to precisely define the state's power to regulate a minor's
conduct, but it did uphold the principle articulated in Danforth1 °° that
state restrictions on a minor's privacy rights are valid only if the lim-
its serve any significant interest of the state.'"' Since the state's inter-
ests were not great enough to absolutely veto an abortion for a minor
without parental consent, 0 2 the Court in Carey held that "the consti-
tutionality of a blanket prohibition on the distribution of contracep-
tives to minors is a fortiori foreclosed."'' 0 3 Secondly, in TH. v.
Jones,10 4 the Court earlier emphasized that the state's interest must be
"substantial" in order to override the minor's constitutional right to
privacy. There, a Utah state regulation prohibiting family planning
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), members of the Amish Church violated a law compel-
ling school attendance for children through age sixteen. The Supreme Court made an excep-
tion to this law for the Amish because there was no compelling state interest that would be
adversely affected by the exception; "[I1t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepara-
tion for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id. at 535. The Supreme Court
found that a state's interest in universal education must be balanced with the rights it impinges
upon. The Court allowed private religious schools to teach children, as long as the education
adequately prepared them for "additional obligations." "[The child is not the mere creature
of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Id.
97. An adult's right to contraceptives was firmly established in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). Minor's rights were not discussed.
98. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 692-97.
99. Id.
100. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
101. Carey, 431 U.S. at 692-93.
102. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
103. Carey, 431 U.S. at 694.
104. 425 F. Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975). The plaintiff represented a class of "herself and all
other minors in the state who receive either AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children]
or Medicaid or both and who seek family planning assistance from the [Utah Planned
Parenthood Association]." Id. at 876. The challenge here was to a state law requiring paren-
tal consent as a condition for a minor's access to family planning services (upon Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children and Medicaid eligibility requirements). Id. A class-action
challenged the legality under federal law of Utah's law requiring parental consent in order for
a minor to receive family planning assistance. The plaintiff was fifteen years old and a member
of a family receiving AFDC and Medicaid. She refused to get parental consent, so the family
planning center could not serve her. Id.
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clinics from providing contraceptives to minors without parental con-
sent was overruled because the statute conflicted with federal law by
impermissably adding a consent provision. The state failed to justify
this condition by a showing of a substantial interest. 15 Utah argued
that protecting minor females "from the evil effects and unsuspected
harm of actions which go against the mores of society"'10 6 is a compel-
ling state interest. 107 Also, Utah argued that the state was very inter-
ested in enforcing the parents' rights of family control. 108 The district
court found neither of these arguments compelling, especially in the
light of the legislature's failure to enact restrictions which would also
curtail the access of contraceptives to minors who can afford private
doctors. 109
Parents have the "care, custody and nurture of their children as a
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."" t0 The
parents' primary function is to prepare their child for "obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder."'' These obligations include
training in moral standards, religious beliefs, and social elements."
12
Nevertheless, if the state neither requires nor prohibits an activity, the
rights of the parents are not deemed affected. 1 3 For example, a fed-
eral court of appeals in Doe v. Irwin 1,4 found that the distribution of
105. Jones, 425 F. Supp. at 876, 882.
106. Id. at 881.
107. Id.; "Every state has a substantial interest in the health and welfare of all of its in-
habitants." Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1167 (6th Cir. 1980). A state has "an independent
interest in the well-being of its youth." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
108. Jones, 425 F. Supp. at 881.
109. Id. Utah law allows personal physicians to continue dispensing contraceptives even
without parental consent. Id. The regulations challenged in this suit apply only to indigent
minors seeking family planning service from the Utah Planned Parenthood Association. Id. at
881 n.5. Therefore, this discrepancy undercuts Utah's claim that the regulations embody com-
pelling public interests. Id. at 882. The case was decided on the statutory grounds that since
the state law was found to be in conflict with the federal law, the federal law must control
because of the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 880.
110. Irwin, 615 F.2d at 1167.
111. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
112. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
113. Irwin, 615 F.2d at 1167-68. "The [parents] remain free to exercise their traditional
care, custody and control over their unemancipated children."
114. Id. at 1162. A class-action was brought by parents of minor children against admin-
istrators of a family planning clinic and the county health department because the clinic dis-
tributed contraceptive devices and medication without notice to the minor's parents. The
parents claimed that their constitutional right to the custody and care of their children was
violated by the clinic. The district court concluded that since there was no compelling state
interest to exclude the child's parents from the contraceptive decision, the right of parents to
participate in their children's sexual activity decisions outweighs the minor's right to make
these decisions independently. Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1977). The
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contraceptives to minors without parental notice did not interfere
with the parents' constitutional rights." 5 There, a class of parents
with minor children sued a Michigan family planning clinic because
minors were not required to notify their parents when they received
contraceptive services." 6 Because Michigan law did not require that
children receive contraceptive services or prohibit the parents from
being notified of this treatment, the parents were still free to exercise
their traditional "care, custody, and nurture" towards their
children. 117
B. The "Squeal Rule" and After
By 1980, the courts in Jones (1975), Carey (1977), and Irwin
(1980) had held that states and parents have no absolute veto over a
minor's decision to use contraceptives." 8 Additionally, the Irwin
court had held that parents' rights were not violated if the parents
were not notified when their children received contraceptive serv-
ices.1" 9 However, the issue of whether required parental notice vio-
lated the minor's rights had not been decided. The Secretary of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services (HSS) tried
to fill this void in 1982 by the "squeal rule," which mandated parental
notice when minors received contraceptive services from federally
funded family planning clinics such as Planned Parenthood. 20
The squeal rule was proposed as an amendment to Title X of the
Public Health Service Act to more fully implement the Congressional
intent behind the 1981 Amendment to Title X. 121 Congress had
passed the Family Planning Services Population and Research Act
(Title X)122 in 1970123 to provide federally funded family planning
lower court found that the parents' rights had been violated. "Parental authority is plenary. It
prevails over the claims of the state, other outsiders, and the children themselves. There must
be some compelling justification for interference." Id. at 1249. The Court of Appeals found no
violation of the parents' rights. Irwin, 615 F.2d at 1169.
115. "In the absence of a constitutional requirement for notice to parents, it is clearly a
matter for the state to determine whether such a requirement is necessary or desirable in




118. Jones, 425 F. Supp. at 882; Carey, 431 U.S. at 695; Irwin, 615 F.2d at 1169.
119. Irwin, 615 F.2d at 1169.
120. 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(12) (1983).
121. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 931(b)(1), 95 Stat. 357, 570 (1981).
122. Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504 (1970). Title X authorized grants for population
research and voluntary family planning programs, such as Planned Parenthood. The purpose
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services in response to the mounting concern in Congress about the
number of unwanted pregnancies in the United States, with its attend-
ant social and medical cost increases.124 Title X was passed to estab-
lish a nationwide program with the express purpose of making
"comprehensive family planning services readily available to all per-
sons desiring such services." 125 In 1981, Title X was amended to re-
quire Title X grantees to encourage family participation in their
programs, to the extent practical.1
26
The proposed changes were threefold. First, Title X projects
must notify parents or guardians within ten working days following
the initial provision of prescription drugs or devices to the unemanci-
pated minor. Verification of notification must be kept on file, in addi-
tion to any exceptions granted by the project director in cases where
notice to parents would result in physical harm to the minor. 27 Sec-
ond, projects must comply with any state laws requiring notice or
consent for unemancipated 128 minors. Finally, the definition of "low
income family" would be changed to consider adolescents on the basis
of their family's resources, rather than their own income, for the pur-
pose of charging for services. 2
9
The proposed requirements were immediately challenged. Two
of Title X was to assist state health authorities in planning, establishing, maintaining, coordi-
nating, and evaluating family planning services by making grants to state health authorities
based on population and financial need. In the first year, Congress authorized a $10 million
appropriation, a $15 million appropriation for the second year, and a $20 million appropria-
tion for the third year. Id.
123. Congress' also intended in Title X to assist all persons with family planning services.
Congressional Declaration of Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-572, § 2, as amended by Act of Oct. 17,
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-88, Title V, § 509(b), 93 Stat. 695.
124. Squealing on Kids, supra note 14, at 9. Under Title X, family planning centers can
obtain federal funding. Their services must be supplied to individuals voluntarily coming to
their center. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300 - 300a-8 (West 1970). Congress'
purpose here was to assist all persons with family planning services. Congressional Declara-
tion of Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-572, § 2, as amended by Act of Oct. 17, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
88, Title V, § 509(b), 93 Stat. 695.
125. Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504 (1970).
126. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300 - 300a-8 (West 1970). Parental in-
volvement was not mandated, only "encouraged." A more stringent requirement, similar to
the squeal rule, had been defeated by the House of Representatives in 1978, due to the fear of
undermining Congress' original intent in enacting Title X. 124 CONG. REC. 37,044 (1978).
127. Amendment of 45 Fed. Reg. 37, 436 (1980) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.2).
128. An unemancipated minor is subject to parental control. California defines an emanci-
pated minor as any person under eighteen who is, or was, (1) married, (2) on active duty with a
branch of the United States armed forces, or (3) has been declared emancipated by the court.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 62 (West 1982).
129. Amendment of 45 Fed. Reg. 37, 436 (1980) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.2).
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lawsuits 30 were filed and over 120,000 individuals and organizations
commented on the proposed amendment.13' The Secretary defended
the new regulations by distinguishing the requirements as not "pro-
hibit[ing] access to contraceptive service. Rather, it implements a
Federal assistance program, i.e., Title X . .., by giving specific mean-
ing to the conditions Congress has established for provisions of the
assistance.' 32 Additionally, the Secretary countered arguments in
favor of no and stricter parental notice requirements.
133
But the judiciary disagreed with this interpretation of the 1981
amendment. The courts in both the Planned Parenthood v. Heckler1
34
and the New York v. Heckler 135 cases held that the proposed require-
ments contravened Congressional intent, which merely encouraged
130. Planned Parenthood v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983); New York v. Heck-
ler, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983).
131. Parental Notification Requirements Applicable to Projects for Family Planning Serv-
ices, 48 Fed. Reg. 3600 (1983) [hereinafter Notification Requirements].
132. Id. at 3602. On August 13, 1981, Congress amended Title X to add "[t]o the extent
practical, entities which receive grants or contracts under this subsection shall encourage fam-
ily [sic] participation in projects assisted under this subsection." Id. at 3600. Also, the Confer-
ence Report on Pub. L. No. 97-35 stressed the importance of family participation in the
activities authorized by Title X. Id. at 3601.
133. For each argument against the amendment, the Secretary justified the new rule.
"A minor's right to privacy is infringed by the amendment."
The minor can decide whether to accept services subject to subsequent parental
notification since he/she is advised of the notice requirement prior to services given
(and is therefore consenting to notification by accepting the services).
"The amendment is gender, age, and income discriminatory."
The regulation is gender neutral on its face (possibly a male contraceptive pill
could make men fall within the scope! of this regulation). The Department is only
using age as a measure of an emancipated minor's ability to make important deci-
sions. A change in the income requirement merely puts minors on the same footing
as all other applicants for services. "Parental notice should be required before contra-
ceptive service is given so that family discussion can take place before contraceptives
are given and also possibly dissuade minor[s] from being sexually active."
This would cause undue delays or otherwise restrict access to minors contrary to
the statute's policy.
"Parental consent should be required."
Parental consent would lead to an improper balance of service to minors for
family planning.
Id. at 3601-05.
134. 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
135. 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983). Planned Parenthood was decided prior to New York
(July, 1983) by the District of Columbia Circuit. The Planned Parenthood court issued a per-
manent injunction against the enforcement of the squeal rule. Planned Parenthood, 712 F.2d
at 665. The New York case was decided in October 1983 by the Second Circuit. New York,
719 F.2d at 1197. Judge Friendly's comment (concurrence and dissent) in New York points
out the doubtful importance of the New York decision:
I am at a loss to understand what it is thought we are accomplishing by deciding this
appeal or how we may properly do so. [The HSS was] permanently enjoined by
[Planned Parenthood v. Heckler]... what we are doing is simply rendering an advi-
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family participation without requiring parental involvement. The is-
sue, more simply, was of statutory construction. 136 Although the Sec-
retary was given authority to make rules in accordance with the
statute, 137 regulations promulgated by the Secretary exceed this statu-
tory authority if the proposed rule shows no relation to any recog-
nized concept of the statute. 138 The Planned Parenthood court found
that "these regulations not only violate Congress' specific intent as to
the issue of parental notification, but also undermine the fundamental
purposes of the Title X program."'1 39 The Secretary, therefore, ex-
ceeded statutory authority since the proposed regulations were not
related to any "recognized concept" of the statute. 14°
Sustaining this interpretation of the purpose of Title X, the
Planned Parenthood v. Matheson 141 court struck down a state law
which imposed a parental notification requirement for minors seeking
contraceptives at a family planning clinic.142 There, the court granted
summary judgment because the state-imposed requirement conflicted
with Title X. 14 3 Of special note here is the strict standard adhered to
which resulted in the grant of summary judgment; Congress must
have positively required by enactment that state law be pre-empted
and state law must damage clear and substantial federal interests.
144
Applying this standard, the court first found that providing access to
sory opinion whether or not we agree with the District of Columbia Circuit - an
opinion which can have no legal consequence to any of the parties.
Id. at 1197-98.
136. Planned Parenthood, 712 F.2d at 654; see also New York, 719 F.2d at 1196. "No
doubt the moral and political wisdom of the Secretary's actions will remain in dispute for some
time to come. The legality of those actions, however, should not." Planned Parenthood, 712
F.2d at 665.
137. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-4(a) (West 1970).
138. Planned Parenthood, 712 F.2d at 655; see also New York, 719 F.2d at 1196.
139. Planned Parenthood, 712 F.2d at 656. The Conference Committee report accompa-
nying the 1981 amendment specifically relates to this issue: "The Conferees believe that, while
family involvement is not mandated, it is important that families participate... [T]he intent of
the Conferees [is] that grantees [of Title X funds] will encourage participants ... to include
their families." H.R. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 799 (1981). The 1981 amendment
itself was to "encourage" participation to "the extent practical." Public Health Service Act,
42 U.S.C.A. § 330(a) (West 1970).
140. Planned Parenthood, 712 F.2d at 656; New York, 719 F.2d at 1196.
141. 582 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Utah 1983).
142. Id. at 1009.
143. Id. at 1007.
144. Id. at 1004 (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1972)). The court
assumed the statute in question was a family law statute (for purposes of the summary judg-
ment motion to make out the strictest case possible) and therefore applied a stricter preemp-
tion test. Id. at 1004 n.3.
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contraceptives to all minors was "critically significant to Congress
when it enacted and amended Title X.1'1 45 Secondly, the court noted
the statute would do "major damage" to Title X because it would
prevent a minor's confidential access to family planning assistance. 
46
Therefore, the state law was unenforceable because it conflicted un-
duly with federal law.'
47
To illustrate this point more fully, years before the proposed
squeal rule, Congress' intent in enacting Title X had been similarly
interpreted. The court in Doe v. Picket, 48 in 1979,149 held that West
Virginia's denial of birth control and family planning services to mi-
nors without parental consent "clearly thwart[ed Title X's] compre-
hensive goals."' 50  The court read Title X as requiring family
planning services to be available to all persons seeking the services.' 5'
Citing increased incidence of venereal disease, pregnancy and drug
abuse (caused in part, the court hypothesized, by rebellion against pa-
rental wishes), the court realized that access to counselling, medical
advice and other family planning services without parental involve-
ment becomes even more important to achieve the purposes of Title
X. 152
IV. ANALYSIS
United States courts should take a lesson from the House of
Lords. By focusing on resolving the individual factors of acquiring
contraceptive treatment without parental consent, the House of
Lords' discussion broke away from the unresolvable conflict of moral
right and wrong. 53 This disassociation was valuable in that it ena-
bled the court to look beyond the morality issue to the effect of the
Gillick C ruling by the Court of Appeal in 1984, which made parental
consent a prerequisite for a child under sixteen to receive contracep-
tive advice or treatment: "[T]hey cannot get help under sixteen, so
they just go on sleeping with their boyfriends and hope for the
145. Id. at 1006.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 480 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. W. Va. 1979).
149. This decision was reached two years before the Title X amendment requiring the
encouragement of family participation in minors' birth control decisions. Also, Pickett was
decided four years before the squeal rule was enjoined against enforcement of the rule.
150. Pickett, 480 F. Supp. at 1221.
151. Id. at 1220.
152. Id. at 1221.
153. See supra note 3.
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best." 154 Although national statistics are not yet available to show
what happened after the English Court of Appeal required parental
consent in December of 1984, in Camberwell, England, during the
first ten months of 1985, there were thirty-three pregnancies (eleven
from one school), up from a total of eleven the year before.155 In a
south-east London clinic, the number of girls under sixteen coming in
for advice was halved. 156
The House of Lords' decision does not give doctors unbridled
discretion to issue contraceptive treatment and advice. In fact, Lord
Fraser clearly warned that a doctor must discharge his professional
duties accordingly or be disciplined by his own professional body. 157
Even further, a doctor who could not justify the treatment of a child
under sixteen without parental consent by showing that he satisfied
the five conditions could be criminally liable for aiding and abetting
the commission of unlawful sexual intercourse. 158 These restrictions
allay some fears that a minor under sixteen could receive contracep-
tive treatment and advice without any limitations. The five factors
which help the doctor in forming his clinical opinion also restrain the
doctor from prescribing contraceptives without taking the minor's
best interests into consideration. These factors could be adapted for
United States doctors in their determination of whether to prescribe
contraceptives to a minor under sixteen. The doctors who do pre-
scribe contraceptives would be subject to close scrutiny by the United
States Medical Association or even state-funded committees, if the
state wanted to protect its interest of assuring the minor's welfare, to
ensure that the doctors are not breaching their professional
responsibility.
Secondly, statistics show that teens are engaging in sexual inter-
course, whether or not they are protected by contraceptives. Combin-
ing the English and United States statistics, over 140 girls out of every
thousand become pregnant, with almost half of these pregnancies end-
ing in abortion. 159 Commentators in favor of parental consent re-
quirements argue that access to contraceptives increases the statistics
of the number of girls under sixteen who are sexually active, 60 but
154. Anguish, supra note 5, at 15, col. 2.
155. Id. at 15, col. 3.
156. Id.
157. Gillick, 3 W.L.R. at 845.
158. Id. at 843-44.
159. TIMES, supra note 4, at 84.
160. See Notification Requirements, supra note 131.
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access to contraceptives can only decrease the number of pregnant
girls under sixteen. Studies show that girls in the United States who
are sexually active wait almost one year before seeking contraception
and only one in three sexually active girls in the United States be-
tween the ages of fifteen and nineteen use contraceptives. 61 Of those
minors who did in fact use contraceptives, one-fourth get pregnant
anyway. 162 Compare this attitude to Holland's teens: "We've been
told that no Dutch teenager would consider having sex without birth
control . . . [i]t would be like running a red light."' 163 And compare
Holland's teen pregnancy rate with the United States's rate: fifteen
pregnancies per thousand girls in the Netherlands as opposed to
ninety-five pregnancies per thousand girls in the United States.
I64
Parents want to protect their children from these dangers, in-
cluding having sex before the child is physically, emotionally and
mentally ready. A parent's right to the "care, custody and nurture of
their children as a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment" has been recognized by the United States Supreme
Court. 165 Parents have an obligation to prepare their child for society
by instilling in the child precepts of morality and social conduct.
166
But these rights do not extend to an affirmative obligation on society
in general to inform the parents of all their child's actions. 167 The
British attitude of "dwindling rights" seems appropriate since the rea-
son for the right initially was to protect the child until the child could
look out for herself or himself.
The state's interest in the "health and welfare"' 168 of its citizens
complements the minor's privacy interest when the goal is the avoid-
ance of unwanted pregnancies. Currently, many states allow minors
to consent to specific medical treatments 169 and a few states allow a
161. TIMES, supra note 4, at 82.
162. Id. at 81, 82.
163. Id. at 82 (quoting spokesperson Jane Murray, for the Alan Guttmacher Institution,
which is a non-profit research center in New York).
164. Id. at 84.
165. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1167 (6th Cir. 1980).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1169.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 34.10 (West 1982) (minimum age for drug and alcohol
treatment consent is twelve years); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11!, 4504 (1981) (minimum age for
consent for treatment for depressant or stimulant drugs is twelve years); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 34.5 (West 1982) (prevention and treatment of pregnancy); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-1
(West 1976) (pregnancy). The list goes on and on.
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minor to consent to receiving contraceptives. 17 0 A universal example
of state legislation for the good of society is venereal disease laws. To
control the spread of venereal disease, all fifty states and the District
of Columbia have statutes allowing a minor to consent to the diagno-
sis and the treatment of venereal disease.' 7 1 The state also has an
interest in protecting their young female citizens from the emotional
and physical impact of an unwanted pregnancy, but this interest in-
cludes protecting these minors before they have sexual intercourse.
However, despite this strong state interest, and corresponding efforts
to further such interests, the incidence of intercourse among unmar-
ried teens increased by two-thirds during the 1970's.172 Since the
state's interest seems to be no bar to sexual intercourse for a signifi-
cant number of minors, the state must try to shield these sexually
active females from unwanted pregnancies. 73 Choosing between re-
strictions on availability of contraceptives, resulting in unwanted
pregnancies and abortions, or allowing confidential access to contra-
ceptives, the better course is to allow these sexually active teens access
to confidential contraceptives.
Finally, as the statistics have indicated, the problem of "babies
having babies" is not controlled completely by confidential access to
contraceptives. Even when contraceptives are available, many times
they are not used or not used properly. Therefore, states should en-
courage educational programs, such as Planned Parenthood, to en-
sure the effective use of contraceptives.
Besides the issue of education, an even greater need must be ad-
dressed. Both United States and English scholars have concluded
170. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-105 (1973) (contraceptive devices, supplies, procedures,
and information if minor is in need, pregnant, or referred by physician, clergy, school, agency,
or family planning clinic); VA. CODE § 54-325.2(D)(2) (1982) (birth control; V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, § 291 (1976) (family planning). This list too could go on. The irony of these statutes is
that many states will allow a minor to consent to medical treatment if the minor is pregnant or
has been pregnant in the past.
171. Cohn, Minor's Right to Consent to Medical Care, 31 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 286, 292
(1985).
172. TIMES, supra note 4, at 81. One-fifth of the unmarried teens admitted they were
sexually active at fifteen, one-third admitted they were sexually active at sixteen, and 43%
admitted they were sexually active at seventeen. Id.
173. The state protects its interest by promulgating and enforcing statutory rape laws.
Considering that many states have these laws, two possible conclusions arise from the in-
creased incidence of teen sex coupled with statutory rape laws: either the laws do not discour-
age the teens from being sexually active, or the laws only discourage the teens from being
sexually active to some extent, so that without the laws, the number of sexually active teens
would be much greater.
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that many underprivileged girls have babies just to have someone who
will love them. 17 4 In an English study of 120 under-age mothers,
most of the girls had very hard lives, such as coping with terrible
housing conditions and other difficulties. 17 5 The likelihood of a girl
from a depressed area keeping her baby is substantial; "[t]he greater
the deprivation, the more the girls want their babies."'' 76 For these
underprivileged teens, getting pregnant has little to do with sex,
rather it is a means of fulfilling their need for security; "[i]t's like
when kids get puppies."' 177 In sum, contraception alone will not de-
crease the incidence of teen pregnancies. Education must be consid-
ered, as well as wide social changes to reverse the depression and
sense of worthlessness of the underprivileged teen.
V. CONCLUSION
Although currently no parental consent is required in order for
minors in the United States to receive contraceptive advice and treat-
ment, there are no guarantees that this situation will remain un-
changed. In fact, since taking office, President Reagan has attempted
several times to restrict the availability of family planning services,
including promulgation of the "squeal rule."' 178 Recently, a federal
court of appeal struck down a state-imposed parental consent require-
ment for the receipt of family planning services after the Planned
Parenthood and the New York decisions invalidated such a condition,
which the Utah Department of Health tried to justify by the possibil-
ity of creating a "referral system" for minors lacking parental con-
sent. 79 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has not
decided whether minors have a right to confidential contraceptives,
because the challenges to this right (the "squeal rule" cases) have held
only that the "squeal rule" was improper because the HHS Secretary
did not have the authority to promulgate the rule.
The English approach, giving minors a right to confidential con-
traceptives when access is in the minor's best interests, is a strong
ruling on which to base our own policy. Not only do we share the
same origins of legal and social traditions, we share the same problem
174. TIMES, supra note 4, at 87, 90; see Anguish, supra note 5.
175. Anguish, supra note 5, at 15, col. 3-4.
176. Id., at 15, col. 4.
177. TIMES, supra note 4, at 84 (quoting Pat Berg, director of a Chicago program for
homeless youths).
178. Id. at 82.
179. Does v. Utah Dep't of Health, 776 F.2d 253, 255-56 (10th Cir. 1985).
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of high pregnancy rates for teens and the depressed economic condi-
tions which aggravate the problems. Let's take a lesson from
England.
Monica J. Mitchell
